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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND THE LAWYER'S
RESPONSIBILITY
Stanley A. Weigel*
Mr. Loyd Wright advocates disbarment of any lawyer who
publicly declines to answer, on Fifth Amendment grounds, ques-
tions relating to affiliation with the Communist Party or other
subversive organizations or subversive persons.1
Mr. Wright's position is that disbarment should be the con-
sequence regardless of whether the right is exercised before a
court or before a committee and even in the total absence of sup-
porting evidence of disloyalty.
Mr. Wright advocates policy. The issue is not as to what
the policy is, nor, for that matter, what the law is. The issue is
--what they ought to be.
In essence, the policy for which Mr. Wright contends is this:
Exercise of the constitutional right-that and that alone-shall
require summary disbarment.
I could not more emphatically disagree.
The disagreement may be deep and pervasive. Let's explore
this.
All thoughtful lawyers, whatever their view on the precise
question of the professional consequences of exercise of the con-
stitutional right, are deeply concerned not only with their re-
sponsibilities for public welfare, but with the preservation of
the American tradition-the preservation, indeed, of our very
nation.
The thesis is familiar. We are fighting for survival in a
cold war. The main enemy is Communism as a ruthless, sinister
conspiracy dedicated to world mastery. The conspirators bore
from within. To them, the end justifies the means. Their cap-
abilities and perserverance must not be underestimated. Sound
measures, strong measures, must be taken for preservation against
the insidious menace.
Member California Bar Association and American Bar Association.
1 Mr. Wright, of course, means that "subversive" means, at the mini-
mum, "disloyalty." Ile would agree, I am confident, that there is great
danger in a loose or vague definition of any standard for disciplinary action
implying criminal disloyalty.
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On this I agree.2
The basic disagreement is upon what sound and strong meas-
ures are most effective in repelling the enemy. I hold that they
are those which strengthen, not trim, the Bill of Rights, which,
in the end, distinguishes us from our ideological enemies. I be-
lieve that we surrender to concepts foreign to the American tra-
dition when-however strong the temptation-we water down
constitutional rights, or, if this be overstatement, water down
the fair implications of constitutional rights.
Having outlined the cleavage in viewpoint, it will be useful,
before argument and advocacy in support of my own, to enumer-
ate areas of agreement of Mr. Wright and myself. There are
many.
We agree that lawyers "... occupy a special position in the
American scheme of things," that, as lawyers, it is ". . . our
unique privilege to pursue the practice of the arts and skills in
which we have been trained," and that the privilege carries with
it "... . our obligation to the public to employ our training in the
best interests of the community at large. ' 3
We agree that:
• . .The purpose behind the privilege against self-incrimination
is the protection of the innocent . . . if we would protect the
innocent we must also shield the guilty.... As Blackstone put
it, it is better to allow ninety-nine guilty men to escape than to
convict one innocent man. Being committed to that course, we
must be ready to tolerate a measure of protection for the guilty.
But our rules are nevertheless designed for the benefit of the
innocent.4
We agree that:
A second subsidiary purpose of the privilege, and perhaps a more
significant justification for it in the present day, Is the pro-
tection of the innocent from the coercive measures of the over-
zealous enforcement officer. . . By requiring that evidence of
crime come from sources other than the mouth of the accused,
we remove one temptation from the police to employ coercive
means. As an English commentator on the privilege explains this
purpose, it is much easier "to sit comfortably in the shade, rub-
bing red pepper into a poor devil's eyes, than to go about in the
2 I do not share the additional view apparently held by some that the
enemy's arsenal of ideas is much to be feared in competition with our own.
3Loyd Wright, supra at 575.
4Id. at 576.
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sun hunting up evidence." The purpose here again is the pro-
tection of the innocent man .... 5
We agree, although Mr. Wright has not put it in these
words, that: Freedom for individuals is an indissoluble element
in the free enterprise system; the extent to which personal rights
can be curtailed without curtailing property rights is limited;
it is implicit in the Bill of Rights that the framers were concerned
with protecting both; and the Bill of Rights is that sort of struc-
ture which is weakened as a whole when any part is weakened.6
While Mr. Wright and I do not agree in detail upon the his-
torical background of the right against self-incrimination, nor
upon the standards governing its proper exercise, the differences
are ancillary to the main issue. In a footnote will be found some
materials useful to those who would search out historical back-
ground as well as various concepts governing proper exercise of
the privilege.7
G Id. at 577. I would delete the phrase "from the police" or would ex-
pand it to read: "from the police, prosecuting attorneys, legislators, judges
and all others clothed with the authority of government."
6 The question before us provides a fairly good illustration of the in-
separable interrelation between personal rights and property rights. The
personal right to assert the privilege against self-incrimination is af-
fected if the price of its exercise is sacrifice of the right to make a living
in one's chosen profession. This is not to contend that the practice of
law is a property right like the ownership of a chattel. It is, however,
a thing of value. Nor is it contended that exacting the price of disbar-
ment for exercise of the constitutional right impairs the effectiveness of
that naked right. But it does make it pretty naked and it is the exaction
of a price.
7 Eliason, Note of Constitutional Limitations on the State's Power to
Regulate Rights and Condition Privileges, 33 Tex. L. Rev. 240 (1954);
Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today (1955); Hunter, Self-Incrimina-
tion-Witness-Loss of Employment by Asserting the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination: A Professor's Dilemma, 34 Neb. L. Rev. 88 (1954);
Huard, The Fifth Amendment-An Evaluation, 42 Geo. L.J. 345 (1954);
Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 Minn. L. Rev.
1 (1949). During the year 1954 the American Bar Association Jour-
nal carried useful and provocative articles, see 40 A.B.A.J. 404, 502, 582,
588 (1954); 41 A.B.A.J. 307 (1955).
Having ruled out text discussion of concepts governing proper ex-
ercise of the privilege, I would fudge a bit by submitting a personal
observation. It has been stated, in support of the contention that the
right against self-incrimination may be properly invoked only by a guilty
witness, that if an innocent witness states, in substance, "I decline to
answer on the ground that my answer would incriminate me," the witness
is guilty of perjury. This contention strikes me as facile, but unsound.
It treats the exercise of the constitutional right as testimony and thus
really boils down to a contention that the witness has answered, in ef-
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For present purposes, let's join with Mr. Wright in accept-
ing the thesis that the constitutional right may properly be in-
voked only in these situations: (1) when the answer would in
fact incriminate the witness; (2) when the answer by a witness
innocent of any crime would supply a link in a chain of facts
which might involve the danger of a criminal prosecution, as in
conspiracy cases; and (3) when failure to claim the privilege
on a first line of questions might constitute waiver of the priv-
ilege as to subsequent questions directed to the same subject.
The main issue, to repeat and sharpen it a bit, is fairly stated
by this question: Should a lawyer who exercises the constitu-
tional right against self-incrimination be summarily disbarred
for no reason whatever except the exercise of that constitutional
right?
Mr. Wright, answering yes, divides the lawyer into two
persons. It is contended that as a citizen he may invoke the
privilege, but that as a lawyer he may not (because if he does,
he will no longer be permitted to be a lawyer).
Now, let's apply the microscope of reason to the split-second
before and after the lawyer has exercised the constitutional right.
And let me exercise the hallowed professional right of assuming
a state of facts.
The lawyer before us is a member of the bar in good stand-
ing. He has been so for many years. His professional activity
has been without blemish. His citizenship has been flawless. He
is an innocent man, a reputable lawyer and a good citizen.
Nothing intervening, he now exercises a right guaranteed
him by the Constitution of the United States (which he has sworn
to uphold).
Presto! This self-same man has now forfeited his right to
practice his profession, losing all standing as a lawyer. His in-
nocence is now questionable. His good citizenship is now suspect.
What has led to this sudden change from white to black?
feet, "I refuse to answer because I am guilty." If that be true, those
who make the contention are really bordering upon urging, if they do
not actually urge, that the constitutional right against self-incrimination
is a right only to confess, but with immunity. Acceptance of the con-
tention is not requisite to prevent abuse of the right; that can be con-
trolled without treating the refusal to answer as testimony. Moreover,
treating the answer as testimony would seem, on other premises, to render
it vulnerable as a conclusion of law.
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Disloyal speech? No. Disloyal writing? No. Disloyal action?
No. Any other hard evidence of disloyalty? No. Any inde-
pendent or external facts of any character suggesting disloyalty?
No. Even any inescapable inference of disloyalty? No.8
How, then, can the cruel consequences of disbarment be justi-
fied? We are told that the answer is that the individual has the
constitutional right against self-incrimination, but has no consti-
tutional right to practice law.
This strikes me as an over-simplification, not free of fallacy.
I agree that the practice of law is a privilege. It is usually a
hard-won privilege. However, this is not to say that the priv-
ilege is devoid of attendant definite and valuable rights. Once
the privilege has vested, no one can sensibly argue that it ought
to be subject to arbitrary revocation.
Is it not arbitrary revocation to destroy the right to practice
law on mere inference, rather than hard evidence-particularly
where, as is the conceded fact, guilt is not the sole justifiable
inference? And doesn't it add to the idea that such revocation
is arbitrary when we have in mind that the constitutional pur-
pose of the right is to protect the innocent?
Now, I neither argue nor believe that it is invalid to draw
the inference that one who refuses to answer on grounds of self-
incrimination might be fully incriminated if he were to answer.
Of course, that is a fair and logical inference. I would go fur-
ther. It is a strong inference. I would go yet further. On logic
alone, it is the most compelling inference.
Even so, there is no escape from this: It is only an infer-
ence. Further, it is not the only inference which may be drawn.
Finally, we open the door to erosion of personal as well as prop-
erty rights when we strip men and women of their regular means
of livelihood upon the basis of mere inference-not, to paraphrase
a bit, the evidence hunted and found in the sun, but a mere in-
ference drawn in the shadeY
s "If, as I suggested earlier, the purpose of the privilege is the pro-
tection of the innocent, there must, of course, be some situations in which
a witness who has committed no crime is legally entitled to refuse to
answer." Loyd Wright, supra, at 581.
9 In our discussion, let us not forget that Mr. Wright would summarily
disbar upon the inference-that and nothing more. The case might well
be different if there were, in addition, testimony of disloyalty, or other
independent facts or evidence logically connecting up to support the in-
ference that guilt underlies the refusal to testify.
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"Well and good," it may be said, "but what about the im-
portance of the bar in the scheme of things, including the con-
cept that lawyers, like Caesar's wife, must be above suspicion?"
Let's examine this for a moment.
Lawyers are important in our scheme of things. But, in the
face of the insidious Communist conspiracy, which is the main
justification for advocating disbarment on inference, just what
American citizens are not important? The professor? The doc-
tor? The clerk? The janitor? All are important. All are
American citizens, equal before the law. All are important also
because the implications of equality are essential to democracy.
In the present context, all are important for yet another
reason.
No American is unimportant to the disloyal Communist con-
spiracy. A janitor, trained to paste together the torn shreds of
paper in the waste basket, conceivably may be more dangerous
to the safety of the nation than ten dozen lawyers invoking the
right against self-incrimination. So, too, a clerk trained to pick
up valuable scraps of information. And so, too, a professor, in-
sidiously molding, as is often suggested, the minds of the young.'0
When it comes to real sabotage, I suggest that a janitor, more
readily than a lawyer, can hide the bomb.
Having posed the possibility of subversion among such cit-
izens as janitors, lawyers, clerks, and professors, I wish to make
it clear that no American, who really understands America, should
regard any citizen or class of citizens as suspect. I would add
that there may be a bit of presumption in lawyers, or members
of any other profession or vocation, deeming themselves of a
higher order of importance in our American way of life. The
janitor's work is as important to him as the lawyer's profession
is to the lawyer. There are some people, at least, among us who
would mark a secret ballot-and perhaps an open one-indicating
their view that the janitor was the more useful citizen.
At this point one hears a voice in opposition saying, "Well
LO I think this has been worn pretty thin. If professors are to be worth
their salt, they must be unafraid of controversy. Those outside of uni-
versities have been much too prone to see Communism, which isn't there,
in professorial statements which displease or anger them or with which
they violently disagree. So far as our university students are concerned,
I have not found them lacking in rugged and critical facility; on the con-
trary, they have shown themselves to be no less competent-often more
accurate-than their elders in detecting dissemblance and propaganda.
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and good, but you have overlooked the contention that an em-
ployer has a right to fire his employee, whatever his occupation-
janitor, clerk, professor, or lawyer-if that employee exercises
his constitutional right against self-incrimination in matters in-
volving subversion."
This is neither so well nor so good. Just where is the line
to be drawn if there be indiscriminate application of a doctrine
that rights are sacrosanct, but privileges relating to gainful work
are not? Is it to be drawn at public employment? At the school?
At the bar? The dock? The factory? The farm? Perhaps the
almshouse?
There are ominous undertones in any philosophy which de-
mands economic hardship, or personal disgrace, or both, as the
price of exercise of constitutional rights. This sounds more like
Communism than Americanism, more totalitarian than democratic.
We lawyers, who know the ugly dangers of substituting in-
ference for evidence, must be the last, not the first, ever to ac-
cept surmise as a complete substitute for evidence." We should
be the first to insist, for ourselves as well as others, that evidence,
facts, actions, must be produced before anyone may be penalized
and stigmatized.
Indeed, in some situations, I am not sure that those who re-
sort to the privilege solely to protect innocent third persons merit
castigation. What I have in mind (and I do not indiscriminately
impugn legislative committees) is the spectacle of browbeating
witnesses, of disregard for reputations and of playing to the gal-
lery heedless of the full truth. We have seen these spectacles
11 As a reverent admirer of Mr. Justice Holmes, I venture to suggest
that he would never have said in McAuliffe v. Mayor of the City of New
Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892), "The petitioner may have
a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right
to be a policeman," had he known that his sentence, so reasonable in the
full context of the particular case, was destined to be tortured by some
into guiding gospel for watering down constitutional rights of which he
was so notable and eloquent a champion. In McAuliffe, the policeman
violated a perfectly sensible rule that "No member of the department
shall be allowed to solicit money or any aid, on any pretense, for any
political purpose whatever." He was discharged after a hearing in which
it was determined that he was guilty of violating the rule. He was not
discharged upon mere inference or surmise. Had that been the case,
I suggest that the great Justice's decision and words would have been
very different; that his words would have had a righteous ring no less
noble than his many eloquent stands for freedom which are too well and
widely known among lawyers to call for repetition here.
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altogether too much of late and would be naive if we were un-
aware that there are those in our midst who would be happy to
present more.
These ugly circuses, these headline heydays may well justify
yet another rational deduction to be drawn from exercise of the
privilege against self-incrimination. That is the deduction that
while the witness may be willing to answer for himself, he is not
willing thereby to open the door to exposure or harrassment of
others who are innocent and to whom he may owe such hardly
un-American loyalties as spring from family devotion, life long
friendship, or mutual respect.
A good deal of our soul-searching about the right against
self-incrimination stems from careless accusation by legislative
committees or subcommittees-sometimes subcommittees of one.
The witness may be uninformed of any charge against him. If
there be accusing documents, or persons, or evidence, he may be
kept in the dark. He is unprotected by the traditional safeguards
of court procedures. Under these circumstances, a single base
and baseless question sullies his reputation, forcing him to spend
the rest of his life trying to clear it.
That is evil enough. It is compounded if the witness has
scruples against being the instrument of visiting the same fate
upon innocent third parties. Then he is torn between his scruples
and such vindication as a negative answer would provide for
him alone.
The constitutional right against self-incrimination does not
stand by itself in the Fifth Amendment. It is bracketed-sig-
nificantly, I suggest-within the same clause as these words:
"nor be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law." In this age of television, radio, and tomorrow's news-
paper today, the accusation implied in any such question as "Do
you belong to the Communist Party?" is in itself enough to dam-
age the reputation of the person to whom it is put. While reputa-
tion may not be property in a physical sense, many value it more
than chattels. I am not too sure that the constitutional guar-
antee against self-incrimination, coupled, as it is, with the due
process clause, should be deemed to provide no foundation what-
ever for an honorable refusal to answer by a person unwilling
to be the instrument of wanton damage to the reputations of in-
nocent third persons.
Of course, the better remedy would be some very substantial
improvement, by Congress and other legislative bodies themselves,
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in the procedures of their committee hearings. Long overdue,
that may come about in time. Meanwhile, the innocent victim
has a hard choice.
All of which returns me to the title, "The Fifth Amendment
and the Lawyer's Responsibility," chosen for this answer to the
point of view expressed by Mr. Wright. The transposition in the
title was intentional. In the long run, it seems to me that the
Fifth Amendment is primary; the lawyer's responsibility sec-
ondary.
In the context of the Fifth Amendment's guaranty of the
right against self-incrimination, I think we must agree that it
is, indeed, "this safeguard against tyranny," the words recently
used to characterize it by the Chief Justice of the United States. 2
I think, too, that we will agree with Professor Hluard, of the
Georgetown University School of Law, that the privilege "is
both an expression of our opposition to justice administered by
inquisition and, at the same time, the bulwark of our protection
from inquisitorial practices."'13
If such be the character and significance of the constitu-
tional right, then, I submit, the lawyer's responsibility is clear.
Our responsibility is to insist that the privilege be respected
to the full, not watered down. It is to convince ourselves and
others that democracy is not so impotent in the face of tyranny-
Communist or otherwise-as to call for diluting the essences of
democracy, one of which is the right against self-incrimination.
It is to recognize that the defense of the United States and of
the free world against tyranny, however pervasive and danger-
ous, does not hinge upon-indeed is not served by--any aban-
donment of the presumption of innocence nor any permitting of
mere inference to be a complete substitute for solid evidence.
Our responsibility, I suggest, is to shout these truths from the
housetops-and to live them-unpopular as they may be at any
given moment in our history.
Are there many among us who, in a calm time, would con-
done, let alone advocate, that American citizens should be stripped
of the means of pursuing their chosen professions or vocations
in the absence of hard and preponderant evidence? Do we not
12 Address of Chief Justice Earl Warren at Washington University. Feb.
19, 1955, from the text reported in 101 Cong. Ree. A1557-A1559 (March
8, 1955).
13Huard, The Fifth Amendment-An Evaluation, 42 Geo. L.J. 345
(1954).
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reveal doubts as to the strength of our Constitution and its prin-
ciples if we retreat because the times are perilous? Is the Amer-
ican tradition of fair play only for fair weather?
Most of us, I suggest, would not interpret or act upon the
Constitution in one way while all is serene, but in another when
the winds howl.
The Chief Justice of the United States distilled his own wis-
dom with that of colleagues past and present when, earlier this
year, he said:
The times in which we are living are not normal times. Power-
ful forces are at work in the world-both to preserve liberty and
to extinguish it. The interplay of hope and fear, belief and
doubt, determination and frustration, keeps the affairs of man-
kind and minds of people in a state of turbulence-a turbulence
that destroys perspective and clouds the vision. Such times call
for constant reflection and reappraisal....
There are some who regard our freedoms merely as their birth-
right which they may simply take for granted. There are others
who would never shrink from the loss of little freedoms-by the
other fellow, of course. And there are also those who would
procrastinate until the deluge. The fact remains, however, we
do have a battle today to keep our freedoms from eroding, just
as Americans in every past age were obliged to struggle for
theirs. Many thoughtful people are of the opinion that the
danger of erosion is greater than that of direct attack.
Departures from the letter and spirit of our constitutional prin-
ciples are not the product of any one person or any one group
of persons. They are more properly chargeable to the entire
body politic; to the suspicion, hatred, intolerance, and irresponsi-
bility that stalk the world today; and also to a lack of apprecia-
tion of the age-old struggle of mankind to achieve our present
day blessings of liberty. Government. whether national, state
or local, is not the sole culprit in this matter. For it does not
operate in a vacuum. In the last analysis it only reflects the
mores, the attitudes, the state of mind of the dominant groups
of society.1i
The Chief Justice reemphasized the threat of erosion of our
traditional rights and posed two questions which, it seems to me,
we lawyers must face and answer:
I have suggested that if there has been damage done to our tra-
ditional rights it has been accomplished by a process of erosion.
Are the privileges and immunities summed up in our Bill of
Rights in danger of loss through subtle changes in our climate
of opinion? Is distrust of our fellow countrymen wearing away
our traditional concept of the innate dignity of man?15
14 Warren, C.J. supra note 12 at 1557, 1558.
15Id. at 1558.
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Our responsibilities as lawyers will best be acquitted, I sub-
mit, if they are underscored with our firm determination to trust
our fellow countrymen and our refusal to encourage suspicion
of our colleagues at the bar. For suspicion is born of fear. And
fear and suspicion, now as in past eras of tension, gnaw at our
Bill of Rights.16
16 Strong conviction leads to strong statement. While I hope my state-
ment has been strong enough for the conviction underlying it, I hope
equally that it neither will nor can be interpreted as challenging the
motives of those who hold different views.
